Twice in two months we had been taken completely by surprise. The overrunning of Norway and the breakthrough at Sedan, with all that followed from these, proved the deadly power of the German initiative. What else had they got ready -prepared and organised to the last inch? Would they suddenly pounce out of tne blue with new weapons, perfect planning, and overwhelming force .. .? n In July he warned the military that invasion fleets might be forming undetected in the Baltic, able to attack quickly through the Kiel Canal 12 . As for his view of an invasion's prospects, after the war Churchill »often wondered ... what would have happened if two hundred thousand German storm troops had actually established themselves ashore« u .
Turning from the »supreme« concern to the antecedents of the first Berlin raid, on 20 July the Prime Minister wrote the Air Staff: »In case there is a raid on the centre of Government in London, it seems very important to be able to return the compliment the next day upon Berlin.« 14 Noteworthily, this does not smack of looking forward to an opportunity for an intrinsically worthwhile attack on specific strategic installations or a shaky population in Berlin. Ending a story not told in Churchill's memoirs, the official histories, or elsewhere, on 17 August the Air Staff instructed Bomber Command: »You are not... to carry out attack on Siemens works tonight. Operation is postponed indefinitely ...« 15 . I found no proof of this surmise in the files but, since the mentioned plant is in Berlin (below), Churchill probably had initiated the superseded order: he had expressed interest in the Berlin question and, anyway, bombing the enemy capital was obviously a matter of high policy. The order and the countermand (presumably also his) will profitably be placed in context below. According to the minutes, on 23 August the War Cabinet discussed British bombing not at all lé . But, as the official air historians -Sir Charles Kingsley Webster and Noble Frankland -put it, on the night of the twenty-fourth »the first bombs fell on central London ...« ; the other two concerned official historians said little more about the number of bombs; one (Collier) noted dramatically that ten districts »suffered heavily« from »bombs intended for targets far away«, which some of »about a dozen« German bombers assigned targets »near the perimeter of the capital« dropped 17 . Suggestively, the London Times of the Monday following this Saturday night incident gives the best perspective and the only published casualty figures; according to a news article, fatalities numbered »about four« and a Ministry of Home Security official, returned from a Sunday inspection, »said that the damage was very small indeed« (issue of 26 August, p. 4). The Sunday Times had known only that in the center »explosions [were] heard apparently in the east« (p. 1, »Late News«).
Churchill's memoirs imply that German intentionality was widely assumed and spread responsibility for the response:
The sporadic raiding of London towards the end of August was promptly answered by us in a retaliatory attack on Berlin. ... The War Cabinet were much in the mood to hit back, to raise the stakes, and to defy the enemy. I was sure they were right... 18 .
Also saying nothing about the British attack's scale, the official air historians and Collier simply noted that the first bombing of Berlin followed that of London by one day; thereby, without identifying the makers of the British decision 19 , they implied that the sequence itself is self-explanatory. Shortly after remarking that »a political demand for retaliation« developed »as the bombing of British towns proceeded«, Butler and said that as a result of bombing attack on London on the night of 24th/25th August, it was likely that the project which he had discussed with the C in C against targets in the Berlin area would be implemented as soon as possible. ... an executive order ... would come through the Air Ministry. ... He stated that he considered it no use undertaking the operation half-heartedly and that pinpricks were useless on these occasions, and that a really heavy scale of attack was necessary 28 . This conversation is described similarly in a section of Bomber Command Headquarters' routine log most unusually placed in this file; according to the log, at an 11:40 A. M. meeting the Senior Air Staff Officer told the Chief of the Air Staff that Bomber Command that night was going to send 100 to 120 bombers against the three Berlin targets mentioned above (possibly plus a marshalling yard) and the Chief of the Air Staff »said that he approved of this programme« 29 . The executive order promised by Churchill apparently never arrived but the records of the telephone conversations obviously were filed to show that the Deputy Chief of the Air Staffs telegram had been superseded; after all, Berlin was bombed that night. Perhaps the telegram should be headed 3:35 A. M. Or perhaps, as merely formal confirmation of a call, it was handied in a leisurely manner by aides. In any case, it suggests that at some point the Chief of the Air Staff tried to accommodate the Prime Minister without disrupting existing plans at the last minute; but evidently Churchill was in a hurry. American press corps still unfamiliar with genuinely heavy bombing and excited by the anti-aircraft fire, engine noise, and searchlight activity of even a tiny raid. In big front-page headlines, the New York paper continued embarrassingly to make it sound as though a »blitz« had already begun (issues of 26, 27, and 29 August and of 1, 5, 6, and 7 September); the editor was fond of the humiliating word »POUNDED«. This eliminated all danger of accusations of escalation against Britain, but vital American aid was believed to depend in large part upon an image of possession of the will and ability to use the aid in prolonged and vigorous resistance 42 .
Unsurprisingly therefore, while three of the Air Ministry Berlin communiqués were tempered by references to visibility problems and uncertainties, all impressively boasted of direct hits, big fires, and/or secondary explosions at targets »in« Berlin or on its »outskirts«; »strong forces« and »heavily bombed« targets were mentioned; oil stocks, aircraft factories, airfields, marshalling yards, the Siemens electrical equipment plant, and power stations were reported bombed (references below). The NYT s London dispatches based on these releases (and on supplied pilot accounts) sympathetically tended to lend them credibility, never cautioning readers about or questioning them; in some, vivid descriptions were volunteered, such as »destructive gusts of bombs« (issue of 1 September). In some of the many communiqué-based prominent front-page headlines about Berlin raids, the identity of the sole source was not mentioned (e.g., issue of 8 September). Generally speaking, the losses in the Bomber force seem unduly heavy. ... At the present time a very heavy price may be paid (a) for information by reconnaissance of the conditions in the German ports and German-controlled ports and river mouths, (b) for the bombing of barges or assemblies of ships thus detected. Apart from this, the long-range bombing of Germany should be conducted with a desire to save the machines ana personnel as much as possible while keeping up a steady attack. It is most important to build up the numbers of the Bomber force, which are very low at the present time 45 .
Similarly, in a 15 July minute to the Vice Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS), he said of ongoing efforts to damage the Kiel Canal: »Nothing could be more important than this, as it prevents any movement of prepared shipping and barges from the Baltic for invasion purposes.« 46 And, according to the minutes, the Chief of the Air Staff's attribution of bombing priority to potential invasion shipping at the 18 July Cabinet meeting did not occasion even discussion of a change 47 . Churchill's attitude suggests that he did not believe (1) that an oil campaign could opportunely immobilize much of the threatening German land, sea, and air forces or (2) that an aircraft-industry campaign could have much effect on the air struggle upon whose outcome the importance of the shipping was known to depend. According to the official air historians, it »was obvious to most of those in authority« that only if »the Luftwaffe could now establish air superiority over Britain« would »the invasion of England ... become a feasible operation of war« 48 . It had to eliminate the fighters able to cover the warships protecting the coast. Judging from his recollections, the Prime Minister felt that »air supremacy« was Germany's »vital need« for landings 49 .
His implicit skepticism about the effectiveness of Bomber Command's current strategic bombing is not surprising. On 7 July the AfYTpublished an Associated Press (AP) dispatch from Berlin reporting on a Government-arranged neutral press tour of the Ruhr and Rhine valleys; it stated that »in the cities visited there was no evidence of actual damage to a military objective« and that »the factories which the correspondents were shown seemed to be working steadily«. A 14 July »News of the Week in Review« article with a Berlin date-line accentuated the fact that travel restrictions, secrecy, and military censorship affected neutrals' reports; but it said nothing to cast doubt upon volitional, affirmative statements such as this one: »Neutrals who have recently driven through the entire Ruhr district report that there is no evidence of the effects on large industrial plants there ...« And Churchill's 15 July remark about the Kiel Canal to the Vice Chief of the Air Staff suggests an inkling of Bomber Command's accuracy problems: »I heard that you had dropped a number of bombs into this area, but that they did no good.« 50 On 4 August the NYT inconspicuously printed news of a neutral correspondents' guided tour of parts of frequently attacked Hamburg, whose port the British had alleged was in »virtual ruins« 51 . According to one dispatch, the party »could see no trace« of bomb damage in the inland areas visited; it continued: »A visit to the harbor and shipping centers also showed these to be intact, it was said.« While emphasizing that much of the city and port had not been seen, an AP Hamburg participant's account gave the same facts. On 6 August the New York paper reported unobtrusively that neutral correspondents who had »extensively« toured a reportedly battered industrial complex had observed only slight damage which did not affect production.
Presumably, a hopeful Prime Minister would have inquired about the neutral press, and in any case Churchill knew about the Hamburg tour. If the references to it in the 5 and 6 August issues of the London Times, which he »carefully scrutinised« every day 52 , were news to him, he either demanded full information or already had no illusions. In the first, the paper's New York correspondent vaguely described the accounts, dismissing the tour as guided. Contradicting this, in the second the »Aero-nautical Correspondent« implied that the visit had consisted entirely of observation from a church tower distant from the bombed harbor areas and oil facilities. And on 5 August the Prime Minister sent the Chiefs of Staff Committee a Minute entitled »Defence Against Invasion« in which the help of a strong Bomber Command was taken for granted and the priority of discovered shipping concentrations was renewed: »Our first line of defence against invasion must as ever be the enemy's ports.« He indicated that this meant »resolute attacks with all our forces available and suitable upon any concentrations of enemy shipping«. If an attempt materialized, approaching fleets, landing troops, bridgeheads, and supply ships were to be bombed 53 .
Foreign journalists did not induce alone this implied renewal of the 11 July note's emphasis on accumulating bombers for tactical use in an invasion crisis. In mid-July the Cabinet's expert, advisory oil committee had asserted (in the words of the official air historians' paraphrase) that »large stocks of aviation spirit in the West meant that no immediate effect could be produced on the activities of the Luftwaffe« and that »suffi-cient damage could not be done in a short time to prevent an invasion of England .. ,« 54 . Since intelligence reached similar conclusions just days before the first Berlin raid 55 , Churchill probably was not told differently earlier in August and did not turn to the capital for its (minor) oil installations. Furthermore, the official estimates evidently indicated that Britain was being greatly outbombed through August 56 and he knew that she was easily uncrippled. From mid-through late August the Minister of Aircraft Production assured his colleagues that enemy bombing was having »some« or a »perceptible« but not a »serious« effect on his results
Whatever his hopes for the long run, the pre-Blitz neutral dispatches (above and below) forbade Churchill to hope, before or after 25 August, for timely, worthwhile supply, morale, or prestige effects on the immediate invasion threat. Since the NYT never reported anything resembling panic or defeatism from Germany, common sense hardly allowed (an in any case never-professed) hope of demoralizing enough Berliners badly and quickly enough to improve September's prospects on the Channel. As has been seen, numerous damaging hits on valuable installations were claimed in the communiqués and fleets as large as eighty-one and forty-eight aircraft were in fact dispatched; accounts of conflagrations and secondary explosions, often at fairly central points, abounded; most noteworthily, the (indeed repeatedly assigned) Siemens plant was supposedly repeatedly damaged, the oil in massive storage tanks ignited, and the (also definitely assigned) Tempelhof airfield struck 58 . None of the neutral dispatches printed in either Times substantially supported any militarily significant claim ! Most were inconclusively disappointing, not mentioning major fires, secondary explosions, or severe damage of any sort; the reportedly attempted raid of 4/5 September apparently did not even prompt an alert in Berlin; in three other raids anti-aircraft fire, engine noise, and/or distant bomb explosions were heard in the center of the city, but evidently no fires or damage were observed there 59 .
And in the 30 August Times, Reuters quoted the Berlin correspondent of a Swedish newspaper regarding the results to date: »Newspaper representatives were taken to ... the Tempelhof aerodrome [and] the Siemens factories to demonstrate that no damage had been caused to these military objectives«. In the 31 August NYT, Knauth wrote of the favored Siemens plant: »Foreign newspaper correspondents had an opportunity to view the damage and found it slight.« Despite a tour of much of the city, as did a similar Associated Press dispatch printed in the same issue, he told of no hits more significant than those on a lumber yard and a shed at Siemens. And even in his quoted 1 September »News of the Week in Review« section »profound shock« article, Knauth observed: »The British raids on Germany can scarcely be described as mass attacks ... They have not caused any serious demoralization.« Having tried in the issue of 3 September to explain away these accounts as misleadingly summarized by himself, in the issue of 4 September the New York correspondent of the London Times wrote:
It is not clear whether British bombings in Germany and in German-occupied countries are largely concealed from neutral correspondents or whether the correspondents are not permitted to say anything about them. If there were no British news about the bombings one might easily suppose that they were only effective in wrecking an occasional farm or apartment house ...
The actual texts did not allow one to hope that many oil-tank infernos or direct hits on the Siemens plant had been concealed. And the friendly NYT, which hid the Berlin dispatches under tiny and misleading headlines, by unhelpful silence implicitly admitted the insignificance of the censorship and the volitional genuineness of the positively negative statements (if the case had been different, the reporters could have informed the editors through embassy communications, going to Sweden, or the like). At least after the first few failures, Churchill inferably was not bombing Berlin to deprive the Germans of oil or electrical equipment. (Indeed, to my knowledge, he never even claimed within the Government to be doing so.) He may not have known that the air marshals felt that nothing in Berlin was »of importance« to the oil or aircraft situation 60 . But what immediate importance can he have attached to distant local airfields, power plants, and railways, and why did he never specify what he wanted assigned? Besides, this Admiralty veteran -surely aware of the cumulative nature at night of navigational errors 61 -surely knew that Berlin (as Butler matter-of-factly put it) »was too far away to make a satisfactory target« 62 at the time. Moreover, on 20 July the C in C of Bomber Command (Charles Portal) had told him that until Far more important to us than the protection of London from terror-bombing was the functioning and articulation of these airfields and the squadrons working from them. ... We never thought of the struggle in terms of the defence of London or any other place, but only who won in the air 86 .
Considering that Churchill (and later the official historians) probably feared a Pearl Harbor-type hostile revisionism, he was rather frank and helpful in this and other passages (below). Churchill evidently assumed that the enemy was planning to begin »violent and continuous bombing of the capital« after defeating Fighter Command in any case; a premature blitz appeared less dangerous and less bloody in two ways: bombers harassed in daylight or attacking at night would have trouble destroying densely populated central areas of the city, let alone the interspersed specific objectives whose impairment would facilitate landing and conquest; an invasion would mean a »massacre 
